Tackling Europe's migration 'crisis' through law and 'new governance' by Cardwell, Paul James
Cardwell, Paul James (2017) Tackling Europe's migration 'crisis' through 
law and 'new governance'. Global Policy. ISSN 1758-5880 (In Press) , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/62664/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
 1 
Tackling (XURSH·V PLJUDWLRQ ¶FULVLV· WKURXJK /DZ DQG ¶New 
GRYHUQDQFH· 
 
Paul James Cardwell 
 
Short title: EU migration, law & new governance 
Abstract 
It has become commonplace to regard the contemporary state of migration to Europe as 
D ¶FULVLV· 7KH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ KDV EHHQ XQGHU SUHVVXUH WR UHVSRQG HIIHFWLYHO\ WR WKLV
¶FULVLV·ZKLFKKDVJRQHWRWKHYHU\WRSRILWVSROLF\-making agenda. However, despite the 
legal powers the EU has to regulate migration, legislative measures appear to have 
declined as an appropriate response. Rather, a constant stream of policy documents has 
UHIHUUHGWR¶WRROV·DQG¶LQVWUXPHQWV·ZKLFKDSSHDUWRIDOORXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRI legislative 
processes, and the democratic scrutiny which goes hand-in-hand with them. This article 
argues that the practices which are emerging from the institutions can be regarded as 
instances of ¶QHZJRYHUQDQFH·ZKLFKDUHIRXQGLQRWKHUDUHDVRI(8DFWivity. To do so 
highlights the risks associated with using non-legal tools to deal with an area where there 
are extremely important consequences for individuals. The policy recommendations 
KLJKOLJKWWKHQHHGIRUYLJLODQFHWRHQVXUHWKDWWKH(8·VVWDWHGYDOues are not undermined 
in the quest IRUGHDOLQJZLWKWKHPLJUDWLRQ¶FULVLV· 
Introduction 
 
Migration dominates the current political agenda in Europe. It has been at the heart of 
election campaigns across the continent, and has spilled into wider debates about 
(XURSH·V HFRQRPLF FXOWXUDO DQG SROLWLFDO LGHQWLWLHV Debates on migration have 
crystallised the VLWXDWLRQ DV D ¶FULVLV· whether or not the actual numbers of individuals 
coming to Europe constitutes a crisis in historical or comparative terms. Nevertheless, 
this perception, coupled with the use RI ¶PLJUDWLRQ· DV D FDWFK-all term for individuals 
crossing borders, a hardening of political rhetoric and inter-state tensions has put the 
spotlight on what the appropriate responses should be. 
 
Policy-making on migration in Europe relies on a complex interplay of regulatory 
competences between the EU and member states. There is a strong distinction between 
free movement rights of EU citizens (where the EU has extensive competence) and 
regulating the situation of third country nationals ZKHUHWKH(8·VFRPSHWHQFHVDUHPRUH
limited). EU legislation on migration from outside Europe has been in place since Treaty 
reforms in the 1990s increased the legal competences of the EU institutions as the next 
stage in the integration process. Responding to the challenges of external migration is 
attracting an increasing amount of EU institutional funds and resources: a trend which 
began several years before migration started its ascendance to the top of the political 
agenda in 2014.  
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The language of the Treaty, which speaks in terms of developing an external ¶FRPPRQ
LPPLJUDWLRQ SROLF\·,1 can be contrasted with the political rhetoric from some member 
states who have resisted and challenged provisions of EU law, such as on refugee 
quotas.2 The interpretation of international law adds an additional layer of complexity: 
for example, under the Dublin Regulation3 on asylum seekers, EU law co-exists with 
national law and decision-making (insofar as determining who qualifies under 
international obligations). 
 
7KH(8·VOHJLVODWLYHDJHQGD on external migration is contained in an increasing number 
of wide-ranging policy programmes, which span the policy fields of the area of freedom, 
security and justice (AFSJ), and foreign policy. But examining the most recent policy 
documents in the AFSJ reveals that less emphasis appears to be placed on using 
established legal instruments as defined in the Treaties in favour of the undefined use of 
¶WRROV·. This trend suggests that there are specific responses to migration challenges 
which sit somewhere outside established legal/regulatory responses. Attempting to meet 
goals via alternative routes to ¶WUDGLWLRQDO·ODZZKHWKHUDWQDWLRQ-state or the EU level) is 
QRWKLQJ QHZ WKH HPHUJHQFH RI ¶VRIW ODZ· KDV EHHQ H[WHQVLYHO\ DQDO\VHG DFURVV PDQ\
policy areas, and not only in the EU context. However, the express call for the use of 
non-traditional ¶tools· to manage migration is problematic for two interrelated reasons. 
 
First, the putting into place and subsequent effects of tools which operate outside 
legislative frameworks risk being more difficult to track. Though this depends on their 
level of formalisation and resemblance to existing tools, we might not know what effect 
they are having, and in particular on the most vulnerable migrants. The use of 
¶LQQRYDWLYH· LQ YDULRXV SROLF\ GRFXPHQWV VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH\ GR QRW follow established 
model(s). %HFDXVH ¶WRROV· HVFKHZ H[LVWLQJ (legislative) frameworks which are open to 
scrutiny and rely on transparency, there is a risk that they might be used to circumvent 
such procedures and obligations. This includes for policies WREHPDGH ¶LQ DFFRUGDQFH
with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 
UHODWLQJWRWKHVWDWXVRIUHIXJHHVDQGRWKHUUHOHYDQWWUHDWLHV·4 
 
Second, by fusing different types of individuals into a catch-DOO WHUP RI ¶PLJUDQW· it is 
equally difficult to ascertain whether ¶WRROV· DUHFRPSOLDQWZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ on, in 
particular, refugees and the international legal frameworks for their protection. This is 
particularly problematic for the EU, since the Treaty refers WR¶WKHVWULFWREVHUYDQFHDQG
the dHYHORSPHQW RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ· DUWLFOH  7(8) as a core component of its 
values in foreign policy. The EU risks failing to uphold its own Treaty-based values, 
including the protection of human rights. 
 
The purpose of this article is to explore WKHW\SHVRI¶WRROV·FXUUHQWO\IRXQGLQWKH(8·V
management of external migration (i.e. excluding the free movement of citizens within 
the EU). Although a comprehensive analysis of every tool is beyond the scope of this 
article, identification of the diverse types reveals the extent to which legal and non-legal 
measures co-exist. The analysis here focusses on irregular migration, asylum seekers and 
refugees (who, whilst subject to different national, EU and international legal regimes 
and levels of protection are often not treated differently by the emergent tools), rather 
than the regulation of ¶UHJXODU·PLJUDWLRQVXFKDVWKH¶%OXH&DUG· initiative). 
 
The means of identifying the tools draws on the extensive OLWHUDWXUHRQ¶QHZJRYHUQDQFH·
in the EU. ¶1ew governance· includes a variety of diverse tools including coordination, 
target-setting, benchmarking and peer-review, and has provided opportunities to 
 3 
understand the effects of informal mechanisms on the European integration process and 
¶WUDGLWLRQDO·law. External-focussed governance, including migration, has played little part 
in the debate. The argument here is that uVLQJ¶QHZJRYHUQDQFH·FDQKHOSilluminate what 
is happening in contemporary EU migration and if the procedural formalism, associated 
transparency and accountable of law is lacking. More specifically, if vague and undefined 
de novo tools are used to circumvent democratic scrutiny, then the commitment to human 
rights and democracy in the Treaty requires us to highlight why this is problematic.   
 
To use new governance in this way uncouples its V\QHUJ\ZLWK¶JRRG·JRYHUQDQFHDQGWR
instead consider what new governance may offer policy-makers opportunities to meet 
goals outside legislative processes. In the first part, the features of new governance in the 
EU context are explored, before identifying why migration has generally remained 
outside of this context and why. After setting out the extent of existing EU migration law 
and its limitations, the article posits two ways of seeing new governance in migration at 
work. The recommendations are to ensure that migration management at the EU is 
subject to democratic scrutiny, and in managing the ¶FULVLV·DQGEH\RQG, migrants do not 
fall victim to rights (and the process of enforcing those rights) being circumvented. 
 
New Governance and the EU 
 
The EU is governed by a set of Treaties which allow the EU institutions the power to 
create legislation (regulations and directives), which is binding on the member states and 
enforceable in courts across the EU. The EU also has competence to make international 
agreements with third countries or international organisations (Article 218 TFEU). The 
OHJLVODWLYH SURFHVV LV FRPSOH[ DQG FDQ JLYHQ WKH (8·V XQLTXH QDWXUH, be lengthy and 
cumbersome. 6LQFH WKHV WKH(8·VPDWXULQJ V\VWHPRI JRYHUQDQFHKDVZLWQHVsed 
WKH ULVHRIDOWHUQDWLYHPHDQV WRIXOILOJRDOVZKLFKKDYHEHHQJURXSHG WRJHWKHUDV ¶QHZ
PRGHVRIJRYHUQDQFH·RU¶QHZJRYHUQDQFH· 
 
In contrast with the regulations and directives that we have come to readily recognise as 
¶(8 ODZ·new governance does not rely on legal enforceability as its key characteristic. 
This does not mean they lack effectiveness. Indeed, a large body of literature tells us that 
they might facilitate change a result of processes including: shaming, diffusion through 
mimesis or discourse, deliberation, learning, and networks (Trubek and Trubek, 2005, 
p.356). They might therefore be more effective in fulfilling goals in more abstract, less 
direct way via varied institutional frameworks (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Piattoni, 2010; 
Stephenson, 2013). However, and of particular relevance for migration where the 
subjects are individuals and their rights, the relationship between Courts and new 
governance is less clear (Scott and Sturm, 2007; Hervey, 2010). This opens the possibility 
that the effectiveness of tools might be a double-edged sword, despite their potential to 
be more reactive to changing contexts than traditional law (Walker and De Búrca, 2007, 
p.521). As tools sometimes exist in conjunction with regulations and directives, there is a 
tendency to overlook their role and importance without adopting a more holistic view 
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008; Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004). 
 
New governance has been particularly visible (and analysed) in areas including economic 
coordination (Hodson and Maher, 2001), the environment (Jordan et. Al., 2005) and the 
¶6RFLDO (XURSH· agenda including employment policy and social protection (Héritier, 
2001). New governance came to particular prominence during the early 2000s: the 
Lisbon European Council (2000) called for the strategic adoption of existing instruments 
and strategies under the ¶Open Method of Coordination· (OMC). The enthusiasm over 
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OMC led to the only identifiable proposal for new governance in migration, as noted 
above (Caviedes, 2004). As it name suggests, the focus was on coordination, rather than 
express integration or harmonisation, since the EU law-making competences are limited in 
social and employment policy areas. As Borrás and Jacobsson (2007, p.186) neatly put it, 
¶The OMC DLPV WR XQOHDVK WKH (8·V VRFLDO GLPHQVLRQ IURP WKH FRQVWUDLQWV RI WKH
Community method. In this sense, the  OMC has so far been able to link, in both 
substantial as well as in procedural terms, the social and economic aspects of the 
(renewed) politics of European integration.·Commentators and the EU institutions alike 
have highlighted the opportunities for citizen participation and making policy-making 
OHVV ¶UHPRWH· (European Commission, 2001), though this is by no means universally 
accepted (Idema and Keleman, 2006; Smismans, 2008). Thus, there is a synergy between 
¶QHZ·JRYHUQDQFHDQG ¶JRRG·RU¶EHWWHU·JRYHUQDQFH which connects citizens to decision-
making processes, and in most of the areas where they have been used are also associated 
with progressive policies of direct concern to citizens. This has suited both advocates of 
more effective policy-making but also the institutions who can legitimately claim 
ownership of an open and inclusive structure (Shore, 2011, p.301).  
 
New Governance in Migration Management 
 
Internal migration has always been a part of the European integration process, since the 
free movement of workers is one of the ¶IRXU IUHHGRPV· RI WKH VLQJOH PDUNHW %\
contrast, external migration management is a newer area of EU competence. Developing 
law and policy-making on external migration emerged as a consequence of moves 
towards abolishing internal borders. Although provisions on the rights of third country 
nationals can be found in external agreements between the EU and third countries dating 
back to the 1970s,5 the Treaty of Amsterdam (1998) marked the point at which the EU 
institutions gained more extensive competences. The general aim of the EU, as per the 
Treaty, is DQ¶HYHUFORVHU8QLRQ·. However, in the fields of AFSJ, and foreign policy, the 
Treaty language is RI ¶FRRSHUDWLRQ·DQG ¶FRPPRQSROLFLHV· UDWKHU WKDQ LQWHJUDWLRQ. This 
does not imply a grand aim of full integration of migration systems (Walker, 2004, p.5) 
but nevertheless relies on a commitment from the member states to act in solidarity. In 
addition, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom have opted-out from some of the 
relevant parts of the Treaty 6  and the Treaty text is more explicit in terms of the 
competences member states retain in this area than in many other areas (Peers, 2008-9). 
This is significant for meeting the challenges of migration as a priority for Europe: it sits 
DWWKHWRSRIWKH(8·Vworking agenda but is not found wiWKLQWKH¶FRUH·RILQWHJUDWLRQ 
 
As discussed above, new governance is prominent in some recent areas of EU activity. 
But the literature has pointed to other features in common, including: 
 where member states are reluctant to pool sovereignty, making ¶LQWHJUDWLRQ·
problematic and often limiting efforts to coordination (see e.g. Walker and De 
Búrca, 2007; Cardwell, 2016) 
 where legislation is limited because it is not the most suitable means to pursue 
coordination/integration in a particular policy area (e.g. Hodson and Meyer, 
2001; Armstrong, 2013) 
 where multiple actors are involved beyond the EU institutions and member 
states to meet goals, including agencies and civil society organisations. (e.g. Vos, 
2000, De Schutter, 2010; Cram, 2011).  
 
Migration management shares some of these features. Without a doubt, it is an area close 
to the heart of sovereignty debates. Recent national elections across the continent have 
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highlighted its prominent place on domestic agendas, often bound up in discussions of 
what the EU should, or should not, be doing. Migration is not only a feature of political 
agendas and rhetoric in western or southern European states but newer members in 
central and eastern Europe. 
 
The other two features are more difficult to apply to migration management. Migration is 
an example of, usually, very extensive legislation covering entry to the territory, penalties 
for infringement and rules on visas, employment rights etc. Although there is legislation 
at the EU level (examined below), this is by no means comprehensive and thus new 
governance is QRWILOOLQJLQD¶JDS·There was, in 2001, a proposal from the Commission 
to use the Open Method of Coordination (generally regarded as the archetype of new 
governance (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004)) in migration governance. Caviedes (2004) 
VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH XVH RI 20& LQ PLJUDWLRQ FRXOG ¶SULVH RSHQ· WKH LPDJH RI ¶IRUWUHVV
(XURSH· WKDW KDG DOUHDG\ FU\VWDOOLVHG E\ WKH ODWH VHDUO\ V +RZHYHU WKLV
proposal did not come to fruition and largely disappeared from the debates. 
 
From an institutional perspective, the emphasis on the use of executive power does not 
preclude the strong role played by EU agencies, including Frontex WKH (8·V H[WHUQDO
borders agency) (Neal, 2009; Carrera et.al., 2013) and the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) (Comte, 2010). However, weak democratic and judicial controls of 
externally-focussed AFSJ agencies has already been highlighted (Carrera et.al, 2013; Vara, 
2015) as well as the far-reaching secrecy of informal, executive-led deliberation structures 
(Curtin, 2014). )URQWH[·V DSSURDFK WR PLJUDWLRQ DFURVV ERUGHUV ZDV LQLWLDOO\ VHFXULW\-
focussed, with the requirement to protect fundamental rights only brought into the 
founding Regulation later: and not without criticism from the Council of Europe and the 
European Ombudsman (Lavenex, 2015). $V &DYLHGHV  KDV QRWHG ¶the member 
states have granted the EU authority even in an immensely salient high politics area, but 
in terms of setting the agenda, governance remains in the hands of the member states in 
the area of LUUHJXODUPLJUDWLRQ· 
 
Similarly, migration management is not an area where civil society is generally regarded as 
having a similar role to play as in areas where new governance is established. With the 
exception of integration of migrants post-arrival, management of migration (and 
migration flows) is generally understood as a governmental function, operating within a 
framework of international law and not susceptible to deregulation or outsourcing. 
However, operationalising migration management relies on the participation of non-state 
actors: for example, private security firms, transport companies (such as airlines) and 
NGOs. Therefore, characterising what happens in contemporary migration management 
in Europe needs to recognise these differences. The involvement of civil society is 
distinct from giving opportunities to civil society actors to voice concerns. The 
Commission has attempted to do in the past, but the emphasis was on marginalisation of 
immigrants rather than policy formation per se (see, for example, Guild 1998, Caviedes 
2004).  
 
The Existing Law on EU Migration 
 
Given the extensive regulation of migration at national level, it is logical to assume that 
WKDW XSORDGLQJ PLJUDWLRQ WR WKH (XURSHDQ OHYHO PDNHV ¶ODZ· WKH H[SHFWHG means to 
PDQDJH LW DQG GHDO ZLWK WKH ¶FULVLV·. Although stopping short of full integration, the 
Treaty articles foresee common immigration policies for regular and irregular, permanent 
and temporary migration. Treaty articles commit the member states WRD¶common policy 
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RQ DV\OXP LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG H[WHUQDO ERUGHU FRQWURO· D ¶FRPPRQ SROLF\ RQ DV\OXP
subsidiary protection and WHPSRUDU\ SURWHFWLRQ· ¶WKH JUDGXDO LQWURGXFWLRQ RI DQ
LQWHJUDWHGPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHPIRUH[WHUQDOERUGHUV·¶FRPPRQSROLF\RQYLVDVDQGRWKHU
short-VWD\UHVLGHQFHSHUPLWV·DQG¶D common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all 
stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country 
nationals residing legally « and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and 
WUDIILFNLQJ LQ KXPDQ EHLQJV·.7 Significantly for the discussion here, the mechanisms to 
achieve these goals are listed as the ordinary legislative procedure, administrative 
cooperation between the member states, and agreements with third countries. 
 
A reading of the relevant Treaty articles suggests that the goals should primarily be met 
by EU legislation that harmonises national legislation. Taken to its logical conclusion, 
agreed rules rather than flexibility would ensure clarity and uniformity in who is able to 
migrate, under what conditions and what happens to those who in an irregular state. 
Even in coordination between systems as foreseen by the Treaty, such as the conditions 
for resident permits for third country nationals, the uniformity provided by legal 
provisions would appear to be the most appropriate means to the end. This view of what 
law should be accomplishing to meet the Treaty goals would in theory leave fewer gaps in 
governance at the formal level at the very least. New governance would then potentially 
serve the purpose of promoting best practice and cooperation between the member 
states within an overarching, legal framework. Unlike in social policy, where the type of 
structuring law is not generally seen as the only or most appropriate means to achieve 
goals, in migration we expect law to do just that.  
 
To attain the goals set out in the Treaty, the Council of the EU has set out multi-annual 
working agenda in the Tampere (1999), Hague (2004) and Stockholm (2009) 
programmes. Concurrently, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) 
(2005)8 is an externally-focussed policy which points to the direction of travel the EU 
should take to achieve its goals. As result, some of the proposals emerging from these 
plans have turned into EU legislation. Many legislative proposals emerged after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, including the Long-Term Residents Directive, 
Family Reunification Directive, Qualification Directive and Returns Directive (see Peers, 
1998; Groenedijk, 2006; McAdam, 2005). Some of these original directives have more 
recently been revised, though their overall content remains largely the same from the 
time of their enactment. As Lavenex has highlighted, the governance of migration has 
particular challenges: 
 
¶1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKHJHQHUDOO\ZHDN OHJDOFKDUDFWHURIPRVWSROLF\ LQVWUXPHQWV
which, adopted under intergovernmental decision-making procedures, rarely 
exceeded the lowest common denominator between the member states, 
implementation has remained a challenge in JHA. Limits on the jurisprudence of 
WKH&-(8KDYHFRPSRXQGHGWKLVGHILFLW·S 
 
Although the development of a body of EU migration law and policy in the decade 
following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam has been termed ¶UHPDUNDEOH·
(Menz, 2015, p.(8OHJLVODWLRQRQH[WHUQDOPLJUDWLRQLVRIWHQOLPLWHGWR¶PLQLPXP
stDQGDUGV·OHJLVODWLRQ. The directives listed above were only agreed after long processes of 
watering down by the member states in the Council and back-and-forth negotiations 
between the institutions. It is significant for the discussion here that the Stockholm 
programme proposed relatively few concrete pieces of legislation. We are certainly very 
far from seeing the comprehensive EU-wide approach that it suggested by the text of 
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Treaty. There has also been no comprehensive follow-up to the Stockholm programme, 
which expired in 2014. In the absence of a firm timetable or concrete proposals, it seems 
that EU legislation is only likely to appear on the horizon when it concerns recasting 
directives, 9  regulating relatively small sectors or dimensions of migration (such as 
proposals for facilitating entry procedures for non-EU students and researchers),10 or will 
concern minimum requirements to which only the member states need subscribe. 
 
Where legislation has emerged, WKH¶ILJKW·DJDLQVW LUUHJXODU¶LOOHJDO·PLJUDWLRQwas initially 
the target rather than rHJXODU ¶OHJDO· PLJUDWLRQ, which was the subject of only very 
limited measures. 11  The ¶%OXH &DUG· GLUHFWLYH 12  was hailed as a potentially significant 
means to attract highly-skilled migrants, though heavily criticised (Lavenex, 2015). It is 
currently being recast, but against the background of different approaches to skilled and 
regular migration amongst the Member States (Cerna, 2016). As Lavenex (2015) notes, 
the migration agenda has moved into the domain of foreign policy, with an 
intensification of dialogue with neighbouring and African countries. However, the 
limitations of EU competence over regular migration means that it is in a relatively weak 
SRVLWLRQ LQ WHUPV RI ZKDW LW FDQ RIIHU WKLUG FRXQWULHV LQ UHWXUQ IRU VHFXULQJ WKH (8·V
external border and reducing the flows of irregular migration. 
 
Finally, eYHQ ZKHQ PLJUDWLRQ LV SHUFHLYHG DV D ¶FULVLV· WKH UHVSRQVH KDV QRW EHHQ D
legislative one at the EU level. This contrasts sharply with, in particular, the push for 
legislation to deal with the economic crisis engulfing the EU during the same period 
(Armstrong, 2013, p.267). ,QVWHDGZHILQGDQLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHURI¶LQQRYDWLYH·WRROVWR
confront the crisis. 
 
Identifying ¶1HZGRYHUQDQFH·LQMigration  
 
In 2014, the first Commissioner with a portfolio devoted to migration was appointed, 
accompanied by a large budget (1.8 billion euros) (European Commission, 2015b) to 
fund migration programmes. ,Q WXUQ WKLV PDNHV WKH &RPPLVVLRQ·V DQQXDO ZRUNSODQV
(European Commission 2015a, 2016, 2017a) an ideal place to seek the measures 
envisaged to tackle migration. Just as the Stockholm programme identified numerous 
areas where legislation would seem to be appropriate but did not explicitly state that 
SURSRVDOV ZRXOG EH PDGH WKHUH DUH UHIHUHQFHV WR XVLQJ ¶DOO DYDLODEOH WRROV· WR PDQDJH
migration in the workplans.  In fact, there are few new legislative proposals on migration. 
and the focus is squarely on developing a ¶SHUPDQHQWFDSDFLW\WRPDQDJHPLJUDWLRQLQD
credible and sustainable manner [which] requires a full range of migration instruments to 
EH LQSODFH· (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQp.13). It is the references to ¶IXOO UDQJH·and 
¶LQVWUXPHQWV·that are of interest here. 
 
Similar provisions are found in the &RPPLVVLRQ·V (XURSHDQ $JHQGD RQ 0LJUDWLRQ
(2015c). 7KH$JHQGDHPSKDVLVHVDQXPEHURI¶FRUHPHDVXUHV·WRUHGXFHPLJUDWLRQURXWHV
across the Mediterranean, through a combination of enforcement of existing rules and 
new measures. There is again an emphasis on using ¶DOOSROLFLHVDQGWRROVDWRXUGLVSRVDO· 
(European Commission, 2015c, p2) but scarce mentions of explicit goals to be achieved 
through new legislation, such as a mandatory and automatically-triggered relocation 
system for refugees and asylum seekers in the case of future mass influxes (European 
Commission, 2015c, p4). The only other mentions of EU legislation in the Agenda are to 
better enforce existing law, such as the Employers Sanctions Directive,13 the Returns 
Directive,14 DQG ¶FRKHUHQW LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ· RI WKH &RPmon European Asylum System. 
&RQWLQXHG HPSKDVLV RQ WKH $JHQGD·V DLPV FRQWLQXHV WR EH WKH FHQWUHSLHFH RI WKH
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&RPPLVVLRQ·V:RUN3ODQ European Commission, 2016, p.13). Thus, the references to 
XVLQJ¶DOODYDLODEOHWRROV·DQG Ǯa full range of migration instruments·PXVWORJLFDOO\PHDQ
something other than traditional legislation.  
 
The Stockholm programme provides some specific examples of tools beyond legislation: 
the use of ¶PLJUDWLRQSURILOHV·¶PLJUDWLRQPLVVLRQV·¶FRRSHUDWLRQSODWIRUPVRQPLJUDWLRQ
DQG GHYHORSPHQW· DQG ¶PRELOLW\ SDUWQHUVKLSV· ILJXUH VWURQJO\ as ¶available tools· XQGHU
development in migration management (Cardwell, 2013). All share a strong emphasis on 
non-binding or enforceable frameworks, involving third countries and international 
organisations in EU policy-making but without being underpinned by legally enforceable 
texts. AV ¶LQQRYDWLYHDQGVRSKLVWLFDWHGWRROV·, they are flexible, non-binding and involve 
other partners. Here, partners DUH WKLUG FRXQWULHV ZKR DUH LQ SRVLWLRQV RI ¶MRLQW
UHVSRQVLELOLW\·WRPHHWJRDOVJHQHUDOO\RQWKHEDVLVRIFRQGLWLRQDOLW\HVSHFLDOO\IRUWKRVH
WKLUGVWDWHVLQWKH(8·VQHLJKERXUKRRG 
 
Even more recently, the Commission continues to call for ¶a comprehensive approach, 
making full use of the entire range of tools at the EU's disposal, combining our legal 
framework, our policy levers and the EU budget to deliver results· (European 
Commission, 2017b, p.2). The juxtaposition of the legal framework with policy levers is 
interesting here, and suggestive of the use of tools which combine with, or at the very 
least operate within, the existing competences in conjunction with the participation of 
others (such as third states) over whom the EU has influence. Such an approach can be 
VHHQ DV WKH ¶H[WHUQDOLVDWLRQ· RU ¶H[WUD-WHUULWRULDOLVDWLRQ· of migration control, which has 
long been a focus of criticism of EU migration policy (see e.g., Rijpma and Cremona, 
2007; Davitti and La Chimia, 2017). To examine this further, the remainder of this article 
suggests how we might categories such tools. As noted above, a comprehensive analysis 
of every tool is beyond the scope of this article. However, identification of the diverse 
types of instrument detected within the management of irregular migration reveals the 
extent to which legal and non-legal measures co-exist. These are grouped into two 
categories: co-existence, where tools of new governance exist alongside or as part of the 
established legal framework; and replacement or substitution, where tools are used 
instead. Whilst both instances can be understood as new governance, it is argued here 
that the latter are of particular concern from the perspective of the legal protection of 
migrants and their rights. 
 
Co-existence of Law and New Governance 
 
Existing literature points to the combination of new governance with law, sometimes 
even within the same legislative instrument (Jordan et al, 2005, Falkner el al, 2005). If 
migration management is brought within the scope of analysis, then we can see that this 
LVDOVRWKHFDVH)RULQVWDQFH LQWKH&RXQFLO·V&RQFOXVLRQVRI-XQHZHILQGWKH
following: 
 
in addition to readmission agreements, non-legally binding working arrangements 
on identification, return and readmission could be established with third 
countries at EU level ... Such non-legally binding arrangements « may pave the 
way for the negotiation and conclusion of future EU readmission agreements as 
cooperation improves. (Council of the EU, 2016, p.4) 
 
7KLV PHDQV RI VXSSOHPHQWLQJ DQG RSHUDWLRQDOL]LQJ DJUHHPHQWV YLD ¶ZRUNLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQWV· LV ORJLFDO IURP WKH SRLQW RI YLHZ RI HIILFLHQF\ :H ZRXOG H[SHFW LW LQ
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national contexts, and therefore we should expect it in the EU context too. However, 
what this means in practice is much less clear or transparent. It is unclear, for instance, 
ZKDW RWKHU ERGLHV PLJKW EH LQYROYHG LQ ¶ZRUNLQJ DUUDQJHPHQWV· DQG WR ZKDW H[WHQW
human rights obligations can be transferred to other actors. Carrera and Hernández i 
Sagrera (2011 KDYH KLJKOLJKWHG WKHVH ULVNV DQG WKHLU MXGLFLDO ¶VRIWQHVV· LQ UHODWLRQ WR
PRELOLW\SDUWQHUVKLSZKLFKWKH\WHUP¶LQVHFXULW\partnerships·  In other words, we find 
the risks associated with governance frameworks lacking the formulism and procedural 
accountability of law (Joerges, 2007). Herein lies an important distinction between the 
promises of new governance for accountability and transparency in the internal spheres, 
QDPHO\ WKH ¶QHZIRUPVRf dynamic accountability and peer review which discipline the 
VWDWH DQG SURWHFW WKH ULJKWV RI FLWL]HQV· 6DEHO DQG =HLWOLQ  p.276), since the 
individuals concerned by the working arrangements have little or no access to the tools 
which affect them.  
 
Therefore, whilst we could expect EU institutions to work to put policies in action via 
cooperation on migration management, including with third states, the missing link is 
being able to track what is happening. The literature on Social Europe tells us that (very) 
soft law elaboration of hard law norms is possible (Scott, 2011, p.330). What is meant by 
WKLVLVWKDWUHJDUGLQJ¶ZRUNLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV·EHWZHHQWHFKQLFDOHOLWHVDQGH[SHUWVDVQRW
¶OHJDO· EHFDXVH WKH SURFHVVHV DQG RXWFRPHV GR QRW ZRUN LQ WKH VDPH way is an 
insufficient means to regard them as having only negligible effects. The broad goals of 
the tools therefore are to facilitate the means by which to manage migration more 
effectively. But, as the Commission admits, the variety of tools which have been 
introduced under the GAMM lack clear, logical relationships (European Commission, 
2011) and the emergence of a relatively high number of policy documents on dealing 
ZLWK WKH PLJUDWLRQ ¶FULVLV· OHDGV WR DQ LQFUHDVLQJ OLNHOLKRRG WKDW WRROV SURFHVVHV DQd 
mechanisms will be hidden from scrutiny. This includes the scrutiny of the European 
Parliament, despite its increasing important role in the legislative procedure (Lopatin, 
2013). As such, the problem with new governance as highlighted by Sabel and Zeitlin 
(2008, p.304) is that there is, ¶no actor among those seeking to coordinate their efforts 
has a precise enough idea of the goal either to give precise instructions to the others or 
UHOLDEO\UHFRJQLVHZKHQWKHLUDFWLRQVGRRUGRQ·WVHUYHWKHVSHFLILHGHQG·5HWXUQLQJWRD
core legal point, the tools would then sit outside the important and long-standing Meroni 
doctrine established by the Court of Justice on delegation of authority via legislative 
goals.15 This opens the possibility that the effects on migrants and their rights may not 
necessarily be intended as escaping scrutiny, but evolve in such a way that they do. In 
this respect, they can be distinguish from the following category. 
 
Replacement or Substitution 
 
Two examples in irregular migration management suggest how less formal tools are 
potentially capable of attaining similar results as law. First, the use of readmission 
agreements between the EU and third countries has increased in recent years. 
Readmission agreements themselves have been strongly criticised in terms of the 
¶EOXUULQJ· of human rights protection in the third country (Carrera, 2016) and the lack of 
transparency surrounding their practical enforcement, but there are also examples of 
wKHUHUHDGPLVVLRQ¶DUUDQJHPHQWV·DUHIDFLOLWDWHGHYHQZKHUHDUHDGPLVVLRQDJUHHPHQWLV
not in place.  
 
The Pilot Project on Returns to Pakistan and Bangladesh as agreed by the Council in 
June 2014 (Council of the EU, 2014) is one such example. An EU-Pakistan readmission 
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agreement is in place since 2010, but with Bangladesh, only a bilateral High Level 
Dialogue exists. Therefore, it is unclear what specific legal framework the practical 
arrangements are taking place. The project aims WR ¶PRELOLVH all adequate means in the 
IUDPHZRUNRIWKHPRUHIRUPRUHSULQFLSOH·WR¶VWLPXODWH·WKHWKLUGFRXQWULHVWRLPSURYH
the return rate of nationals found to be in an irregular state (Council of the EU, 2014, 
p4). The European Agenda states that this approach LV DQ ¶LPSRUWDQW SUDFWLFDO
GHPRQVWUDWLRQ RI WKH ZD\ IRUZDUG· LQ UHWXUQLQJ PLJUDQWV ,W FDQ EH XQGHUVWood as an 
example of new governance, since it is flexible, member states can opt to participate or 
not, it relies on information-sharing and best practice, and there is participation by other 
actors, namely the third states. But whilst this might be an effective means to fulfil 
PLJUDWLRQ PDQDJHPHQW JRDOV LW LV IDU IURP RXU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ¶JRRG· JRYHUQDQFH
Given the risks associated with the lack of public participation (and hence a degree of 
oversight as to what is happening) or the scrutiny provided by legislative processes in 
such a measure, there is a need to ensure that analytical frameworks are capable of 
capturing what is happening.  
 
With AfghanistDQ WKHUH LVQRUHDGPLVVLRQDJUHHPHQWEXW UDWKHUD ¶-RLQW:D\)RUZDUG·
between the EU and Afghan government.16 The document clearly states that it is ¶QRW
intended to create legal rights or obligations under international law· %XW LWV PDLQ
SXUSRVHLV¶to establish a rapid, effective and manageable process for a smooth, dignified 
and orderly return of Afghan nationals who do not fulfil the conditions in force for entry 
to, presence in, or residence on the territory of the EU, and to facilitate their 
reintegration in AfghaniVWDQLQDVSLULWRIFRRSHUDWLRQ·This includes both voluntary and 
non-voluntary returns. In the absence of an agreement, this informal mechanism for 
returning individuals with the cooperation of non-governmental organisations (such as 
airlines), appears to substitute a legally-defined procedure with an informal tool. 
 
7KH(8·V 2016 ¶agreement· with Turkey is another case in point. On the one hand, we 
might expect states or organisations to be able to pursue cooperation with other 
countries but which do not entail any particular obligations. But this agreement goes 
beyond that: it was not put in place via the process set out in Treaty but rather through 
informal means. As such, although it is an agreement (in the everyday sense of the word) 
DVERWKSDUWLHVFRPPLWWRFHUWDLQDFWLRQVLWLVQRWWHUPHGDQ¶DJUHHPHQW·5DWKHULWLVD
¶VWDWHPHQW·DWHUPZKLFKGRHVQRWLPSO\DQ\OHJDOFRQQRWDWLRQVRUFRQVHTXHQFHV 
 
The VWDWHPHQWSXEOLVKHGRQWKH&RXQFLO·VZHEVLWH states that all new irregular migrants 
crossing from Turkey to Greece will be returned; migrants not applying for asylum or 
whose application for asylum has been found to be unfounded or inadmissible will be 
returned to Turkey; for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, 
another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the European Union.17 
 
The statement therefore avoids obligations under both EU law and international law in 
two ways. First, it is not a legal agreement and therefore its legality cannot be successfully 
challenged in court. This was also made clear by the General Court (which is responsible 
for individual claims on the validity of EU law via Article 263 TFEU). Following a 
challenge to the legality of the statement in the Court brought by three Pakistani and 
Afghan nationals, 18  the Court found that the ¶VWDWHPHQW· LV QRW DQ DJUHHPHQW
Furthermore, the view of the Court is that it was not concluded by the Council of the 
(8 EXW UDWKHU WKH PHPEHU VWDWHV LQ VSLWH RI LW EHLQJ WHUPHG WKH ¶EU-Turkey 
VWDWHPHQW·). The Court stated that: 
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neither the European Council nor any other institution of the EU decided to 
conclude an agreement with the Turkish Government on the subject of the 
migration crisis. In the absence of any act of an institution of the EU, the legality 
of which it could review under Article 263 TFEU, the Court declares that it lacks 
jurisdiction to hear and determine the actions brought by the three asylum 
seekers. 
 
Second, the obligation of non-refoulement in international law is avoided because the 
emphasis is placed on prevent migrants from reaching the territory of the EU, or 
returning them as soon as possible to Turkey. The statement has been lauded as a 
success by the EU (despite the growing tensions in the bilateral relationship with Turkey) 
as this migration route has effectively been closed and fewer migrants are making the 
perilous trip. However, this is likely to mean that they are instead finding alternative (and 
more dangerous) routes (Sigona, 2017). Therefore, the statement might be understood as 
representing a successful meeting of migration policy goals. However, the substitution of 
DQDJUHHPHQWZKLFKFDQEHVXVFHSWLEOHWROHJDOFKDOOHQJHZLWKD¶VWDWHPHQW·ZKLFKLVQRW
is suggested here to be an example of new governance which avoids established frames 
of transparency and legitimacy. 
Conclusions 
 
With the gaps in judicial protection and scrutiny in terms of obligations under 
international law, migration management looks increasingly problematic in terms of 
accountability and legitimation, as well as a reflection on how the EU upholds its own 
values as stated in the Treaty.19 This is brought into sharp focus when migration is 
presented as a ¶crisis·, and less as a humanitarian one than a security threat and therefore 
something to be combatted. RHIHUHQFH WR WDNLQJ ¶ILUP PHDVXUHV· in official 
documentation respond to this need to feel VHFXUHE\HQVXULQJWKDWWKHPLJUDWLRQ¶FULVLV·
is contained (European Commission, 2014). 
 
This article has explored contemporary management of migration in the EU and 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHXVHRI¶tools· can be understood as examples of ¶QHZJRYHUQDQFH·,W
has argued that new governance therefore can help us to identify some of the contours 
of the tools which the official discourse of the EU refers to, but which do not enjoy clear 
definitions. 7KHODQJXDJHRI¶LQQRYDWLRQ·LQPLJUDWLRQSolicy-making masks the danger of 
bypassing existing, legitimate frames. Whilst these instruments could have been put in 
place by the established legislative process or international agreements, instead they have 
emerged through alternate means. Unlike other areas where new governance has played a 
significant role, in this domain the human rights dimension is at the forefront. As a 
result, those most concerned by the tools, i.e. individual migrants, may have no 
opportunity to challenge them.  The gaps in judicial protection at the EU level are 
revealed to be particularly flagrant when instances of new governance seemingly go 
beyond coordination but actually resulting in decisions which affect individuals. 
 
The EU and its member states appear therefore to be faced with a stark choice. The 
innovative development of tools which facilitate responses to the challenges of migration 
might have the advantages of expediency. But in doing so there is a real risk that the 
values the EU upholds are undermined, in turn losing credibility both with populations 
in the member states, international organisations and third countries. There is thus an 
urgent need to better understand the tools of governance and inform the debate about 
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what are the appropriate responses to migration challenges. This article has argued that 
¶QHZJRYHUQDQFH· DOORZVXV WRGR VR EXWZLWK FDYHDWV The association with ¶JRRG·RU
¶EHWWHU· JRYHUQDQFH KDs led to a prioritisation of the qualities of governance which are 
destined to connect the EU with its citizens, increase transparency and participation. The 
case of migration management reveals aspects of our understanding of new governance 
that we can, and should, be critical of. This in turn implies a challenge to our 
understanding of EU law insofar as it respects the rule of law and the values the EU 
itself is supposed to uphold. As the EU and its legal system matures, and at the same 
time faces questions about what should it be doing and in what way, we may start to see 
increased ways of working in an enlarged EU which do not fulfil its own stated values of 
respect for the rule of law, fairness, openness and transparency for the benefit of the 
peoples of Europe, and beyond. 
 
Policy implications 
 Institutions including the European Parliament and civil society need to ensure that 
WKH PHQWLRQ RI ¶WRROV· LQ RIILFLDO SROLF\ GRFXPHQWDWLRQ DUH QRW D VXEVWLWXWH IRU
existing legal measures. 
 Particular care needs to be taken to assess whether international legal frameworks for 
protection are not circumvented by informal agreements, for example with third 
states, or practices which are shielded from public view. 
 If instances of new governance are in operation in migration as an alternative to 
¶WUDGLWLRQDO· OHJDO IUDPHZRUN WKHQ WKHXVHRI HVWDEOLVKHGPRGHV VXFK DV WKH2SHQ
Method of Coordination, should be prioritised in order to ensure scrutiny at the 
member state level as well as the EU level. 
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